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Until recently, the conversation on originalism and the role
of precedent has been dominated by two main camps, which I
will call unoriginal originalists and unprecedented preceden-
tialists. Unoriginal originalists refers to people who purport to
pay close attention to text, history, and structure, but when
these sources conflict with precedent, this camp basically does
not have a theory at all. The theory becomes a sort of mud-
dling through, sometimes following precedent and sometimes
not. If one, however, is just going to muddle through, or be
pragmatic about when to follow precedent, does that not un-
dercut the very grounds on which one is an originalist in the
first place? Why not then muddle through across the board or
be pragmatic across the board?
It is tolerably clear, for example, that the exclusionary rule is
completely made up from a constitutional perspective, and that
no Framer ever believed that illegally seized evidence should
be excluded from court; that England never had an exclusion-
ary rule; that the Fourth Amendment definitely does not pro-
vide for an exclusionary rule; and that no state excluded evi-
dence for the first hundred years after the Declaration of
Independence, even though most of the states had Fourth
Amendment counterparts.' If anything is clear, it is that the ex-
clusionary rule is inconsistent with the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, yet none of the supposedly originalist Jus-
tices on the Supreme Court reject the exclusionary rule. Even
Justices Scalia and Thomas exclude evidence pretty regularly,
and never quite tell us why they do so when it means abandon-
ing the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.2
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1. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term -Foreword: The Document
and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 93-94 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91-92 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring
(joined by Thomas, J.)).
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What originalists ought to do is to deduce a theory of prece-
dent from the text, history, and structure of the Constitution
itself, and thus to see what are the proper metes and bounds of
precedent. We have not seen a sustained effort to deduce such
a theory yet, which is why we have unoriginal originalists.
The other side of the text versus precedent debate fares no
better. On the other side are the unprecedented precedential-
ists-scholars and Justices who cannot explain why some-
times the Court ought to overrule and sometimes it ought not
to overrule. Consider the following important statement from
the decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey:3 "[A] decision to overrule should rest on some spe-
cial reason over and above the belief that a prior case was
wrongly decided." 4 This point of view has recently carried the
day on the modern Supreme Court, at least since the Casey
decision. 5 The problem with this thesis is that it is inconsistent
with both pre-Casey and post-Casey precedent. The Casey
Court claims that its view of precedent-the view that a deci-
sion to overrule should rest on some special reason over and
above the belief that the prior case was wrongly decided-has
been "repeated in our cases."6 To support that proposition,
however, the Court cited only dissents!7 Neither of the dissents
cited was squarely on point, which leaves the careful reader
with a sneaking suspicion that perhaps the Casey Court's view
of when to overrule precedent was not well-established in the
pre-Casey case law.
A strict count of the number of cases where the Supreme
Court overruled itself on the basis of text, history, and structure
alone, which excludes cases where there were overrulings be-
cause the doctrine was unworkable or because of some other
pragmatic or doctrinal consideration, reveals five important
cases in the twentieth century pre-Casey, and there may well be
more.8 This includes only pure, naked overrulings; that is, in-
stances where the Court overruled itself based only on a
3. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
4. Id. at 864.
5. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 242-44 (2006).
6. Casey, 505 U.S. at 864.
7. Id. (citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 677 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
8. See Amar, supra note 1, at 34 n.28 (collecting cases).
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changed view of the original meaning of the constitutional
provision in question, effectively holding that the underlying
case was wrong as an originalist matter. Analysis of these cases
leads to the conclusion that Casey put forward a view of the
sanctity of precedent that was itself unprecedented.
A summary of the views presented in my Supreme Court
Foreword published in the Harvard Law Review in 2000 sheds
light on the question of when to overrule a precedent based on
the original meaning of the document itself.9 The Foreword talks
about a great principled divide that cuts across liberalism and
conservatism in constitutional law scholarship. This great prin-
cipled divide among lawyers separates out documentarians-
people who believe in the primacy of text, history, and structure,
like Steven Calabresi on the Right,10 or Justice Hugo Black on the
Left"-and the great doctrinalists in constitutional law-like
David Strauss on the Left,12 or the second Justice Harlan on the
Right.13 I argue that there is a great distinction in principle be-
tween those who pay more attention to the document and those
who tend to privilege the doctrine.
I side with the documentarians, and thus I will try, from the
perspective of the document, to give you its account of doc-
trine. It is an account in which doctrine has an important but
ultimately subordinate place. A thoroughgoing commitment to
the document would leave vast space for judicial doctrine, but
doctrine would ultimately remain subordinate to the document
itself. Article III of the Constitution proclaims that the text of
the Constitution is to be enforced as justiciable law in ordinary
lawsuits. 4 Therefore, the document itself envisions that in de-
ciding cases under it, judges are going to offer interpretations,
give reasons, develop mediating principles, and craft imple-
menting frameworks to enable the document to be construed in
courts as law. These interpretations, reasons, principles, and
9. Amar, supra note 1.
10. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
11. See, e.g., Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960).
12. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U.
CHi. L. REV. 877 (1996).
13. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Common Law Constitution of John Marshall
Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 5 (1991).
14. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2.
No. 3]
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frameworks are, in a word, doctrine, and the Constitution con-
templates that doctrine will exist.
In McCulloch v. Maryland,'- the great Chief Justice Marshall
properly reminded us that our Constitution does not and can-
not partake of the complexity of a legal code.16 Why? Because if
it were that detailed, it would not have been understood by the
public-the people who had to read it to decide whether to vote
it up or down in the ratification process. Consequently, the
broad dictates of the Constitution, in order for the document to
work in court, will have to be concretized in all sorts of ways.
Consider the Fourth Amendment: It establishes general pa-
rameters. The parameters are not, according to the text, that
every search and seizure requires probable cause,17 no matter
what some legal scholars may claim. It does not say that a war-
rant has to issue before each and every search can take place. It
does not say that the exclusion of evidence is the proper re-
sponse to an illegal search.
The text creates parameters, but it does not specify what they
are. What the text does say is that every search and seizure has
to be reasonable. What does an open-ended word like "reason-
able" mean in this context? Interpreting it requires a vast num-
ber of strategic, pragmatic, empiric, institutional, second-best
judgments by courts about how to create a framework of what
searches are reasonable in today's world. Thoroughgoing docu-
mentarians do not mean to displace such an inquiry, so long as
the doctrine really does properly exist as an implementation of
the proper principles that people did authorize.
Documentarians do not begin and end with the document.
We begin with the document, insist on its priority and funda-
mentality, and try to ponder how to translate that wisdom into
rules that can be made to be enforceable in court. To think
about those rules in court, one must distinguish between a su-
preme court and inferior courts. Inferior courts, in general, are
not judicially authorized to disregard the doctrine of the Su-
preme Court, even if those inferior courts think that doctrine is
wrong, because the Constitution itself creates a structure of ver-
15. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
16. Id. at 407.
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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tical authority.18 There may be rare cases in which a judge
might act as a civil disobedient -Michael Paulsen has written
very acutely about that problem 19-but there is no general judi-
cial authority of an inferior to overrule or, if you will, under-
rule or undermine the views of the Supreme Court, even if the
inferior judge thinks that the Supreme Court's rules are incorrect.
Should the Supreme Court be bound by its own prior prece-
dents? Here again, the document provides broad outlines to
the answer, even though it does not answer all the questions
that are raised by this issue. The Constitution creates the Su-
preme Court as a continuous body, and as a continuous body
it is ideally structured to consider what it has done in the past
and to anticipate what it will do in the future. The institutional
design suggests precedent may properly be taken as the de-
fault rule. There ought to be a presumption that the Court will
do again what it has done before, unless and until the Justices
are persuaded that their prior decision was wrong. Accord-
ingly, it makes sense to say that the burden of proof is on
someone who wants to prove that a precedent is mistaken, just
as the burden of proof ought also to be on someone who wants
to prove that a law is unconstitutional. We have a presump-
tion of the constitutionality of statutes, and someone who
wants to overcome that presumption must give reasons if they
are going to succeed in doing so. In other words, the Court
ought not to treat its precedents as if they were more impor-
tant than statutes, which are the people's own pronounce-
ments. Rather, the Court should treat precedents as if they are
comparable in force to statutes; that is to say, as if they are on
a coordinate par with statutes.
Courts might not only treat a past precedent as a default or
starting point; they may even give it a certain epistemic weight.
That our predecessors, who were thoughtful men and women,
came to a certain result might be a reason for thinking that re-
sult is actually the right one. It is not an irrebuttable reason, but
if the precedent came from the pen of John Marshall, for exam-
ple, it might be a very strong reason.
18. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
19. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MIcH. L. REV.
2706, 2733-34 (2003).
No. 3] 965
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Nonetheless, even when the Court comes to a settled convic-
tion that the previous decision was a mistake and that the bur-
den of proof has been overcome, Casey's principle suggests
that the Justices are not even going to try to state whether
what the Court did was really a mistake in the previous case.
For the Court to do that is for the Court to privilege its own
case law even more than statutes. After all, when Congress
makes a constitutional mistake by passing an unconstitutional
statute, the Court is happy to say that Congress has made a
mistake, and to correct it.20
There are other reasons why certain precedents are en-
trenched against reversal. Some mistakes may have been rati-
fied by the people in some way, or ratified by the passage of
time. Another structural feature of the judiciary is that it acts
late in the process, only after the legislative and executive
branches have already acted. Thus, a case involving the consti-
tutionality of the Bank of the United States reached the Su-
preme Court many years after the political branches had
passed on the question.21 Chief Justice Marshall noted in
McCulloch that there had been important reliance interests cre-
ated by the Bank that the Court could not lightly disrupt.22
These reliance interests are why we have a presumption of
constitutionality when it comes to statutes. Because courts act
later in time, and act on things that have already happened,
courts must have a certain respect for the reliance interests that
may have grown up around a law. Similarly, certain prece-
dents may have been, in important respects, relied upon by in-
stitutional actors. Still, the existence of such reliance interests
goes only to the question of what is a proper judicial remedy
for a mistake. It does not go to the question whether a mistake
was made in the first instance.
It might very well mean that the Supreme Court cannot undo
its mistakes on a dime, but the Court's first obligation, when it
has made a mistake, is to tell us it that it has and at least issue a
declaratory judgment to that effect. Perhaps Congress or a state
legislature will respond to the news that the Supreme Court
made a mistake by phasing in a new regime over a course of
20. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
21. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401-02 (1819).
22. Id. at 401.
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years; legislatures can act differently in some ways than the
Supreme Court. Perhaps the Supreme Court will respond to
the conclusion that it made a mistake by gradually trying to get
back to a proper constitutional approach. But it does not seem
to me that when the Supreme Court has made a mistake, it
ought to respond by not telling the citizenry because it fears
that the American people cannot handle the news. The Court
should not, as it did in Casey, say that it refuses to overrule a
mistake because telling the truth would undermine the peo-
ple's confidence in the Supreme Court.23 Such language is un-
precedented and in tension with the Constitution itself.
23. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69 (1992).
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